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HIGHLIGHT
Studies of the grazing fee problem by western universities and
government agencies have focused on the economic and welfare implications
of changes in grazing fee policy.

Ignored in these studies are the

problems of ethics and legal precedent.

This paper examines (1) the theory

and practice of handling real property and (2) legal precedent as they
apply to the grazing fee problem.
In light of the findings of this paper, the joint announcement by
Secretary of Agriculture Orville l. Freeman and Secretary of Interior
Stewart l. Udall of their intention to raise fees over a ten year period
is ill-advised.

Their decision ignores both the welfare aspects of

the problem discussed in other studies and the ethics aspects discussed
in this paper.

Jack F. Hooper is Assistant Professor) Resource Economics, Department of
Range Science, College of Natural Resources.

secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman and Secretary of Interior
Stewart L. Udall recently announced their intention to begin increasing fees
charged for grazing on national forests and publ ic lands under their
administration (USDA, USDI 1968).
The proposed action is a response to instructions contained in the
Bureau of the Budget's Circular #A-25 of September, 1959 and in the Dureau
of the Budget's Natural Resources User Charges Study issued in July , 1964.
These documents direct that a fair market value be obtained for all services
and resources provided through the establishment of a system of reasonable
fee charges and that the users be afforded equitable treatment.
questions arise:

Thus, two

(1) What is fair return to the government? and (2) What

is equitable to the users?
The questions arise because ranchers grazing Federal lands have a
possessory interest in these Federal lands.

The concept of possessory

interest is poorly understood by many who are directly concerned with public
grazing lands.

Yet, it is because of possessory interests that the problem

of adjusting grazing fees arises at all .

The concept of a possessory interest

has important implications for decisions concerning grazing fees.
POSSESSORY INTEREST
A "possessory interest" is a special kind of "leasehold interest".
Thus, to discuss possessory interests, it is first necessary to discuss
leaseholds.
The subject of leasehold valuation is clarified by an understanding of
the bundle of rights theory in real estate appraisal.
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Stated simply, when
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an individual or agency owns real property, the ownership embraces a great
many rights such as the right to occupancy and use, the right to sell, the
right to lease and other benefits of use associated with ownership.

A

property owner who leases his real estate transfers one of the rights in his
bundle to the tenant, namely the right of occupancy and use.
When a lease has been executed, the bundle of rights becomes divided
into two separate interests.

These interests are referred to as (1) the

"1 eased fee estate" or "feehold l l and (2) the "leasehold estate l l (AIREA, 1967).
A possessory interest is a leasehold interest where the leased fee
interest is held by a government body (Goldman, 1951).

CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC RENT
As compensation for the temporary release of one of the rights or
interests in the bundle, the lessor receives rent from the lessee.

The

rental received by the real estate owner under the lease or contract is
known as "contract rentll.

The rental which real estate can command in the

open market at any given time for its highest and best use is known as
I

economic rentll.

If real estate is leased at its fair or market rental

value, contract rent and economic rent are the same.
For various reasons, as time elapses during the life of a lease,
contract rent and economic rent tend to separate.

If factors influencing

real estate value since the lease was exe cuted have been favorable, or if the
contract rent was established on too low a basis, the current economic rent
will generally exceed the contract rent.

If the factors affecting value have

been unfavorable, or if contract rent was established on too high a basis,
contract rent may exceed current economic rent.
If contract and economic rent are the same, then the value of the leased

3
fee estate is essentially the same as the value of the property free of
leases.

If the contract rent is less than economic rent, then the value of

the leased fee interest is less than the value of the property free of
leases and the leasehold interest takes on the value of the difference between
the leased fee value and full market value (free of leases).
VALUATION OF LEASED FEE INTEREST
The value of the leased fee interest consists of two parts:

(1) the

present value of the contract rental income stream for the life of the
lease; and (2) the present value of the real estate which reverts to the
lessor at expiration of the lease.
The contract rent for the term of the lease is income with the
characteristics of an annuity.

This income is capitalized with the use of

a "present worth of one per period" factor (Inwood Coefficient Table, AIREA,

1967) at an appropriate capitalization rate for the remaining term of the
lease.

The capitalization or interest rate may be obtained by observing the

sale of feeholds in the market and observing the incomes associated with each
leased fee estate.
The present worth of the property which reverts to the lessor at
expiration of the lease is the value at reversion discounted by a "present
worth of one" factor (value of reversion table, AIREA, 1967).
The sum of the two parts is the value of the leased fee interest.

If

the contract rent equals economic rent, the value of leased fee interest is
equal to the value of the property free of leases (market value) and there
is no leasehold interest.
VALUATION OF LEASEHOLD INTEREST
As previously stated, the sum of the ''leased feel' and "leasehold"
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values generally equals the value of the entire property free of leases.
Thus, the leasehold interest can be estimated by subtracting the value of the
leased fee interest from the entire property value (fair market value
determined by the three standard approaches, AIREA, 1967).

The leasehold

interest may also be calculated independently as the difference between
"economi c rent" and "contract rent" cap i ta I i zed for the te.rm of the lease at
the appropriate interest rate.

Here again, the capitalization rate must be

extracted from the market by an examination of leasehold sales and the
income stream associated with each leasehold.
EVIDENCE THAT POSSESSORY INTERESTS EXIST
A valuable leasehold may arise under two conditions:

(1) a difference

between economic and contract rent; and/or (2) upon construction of
improvements by the lessee on the feeholder's land.

The lessee's interest

(leasehold) in the property diminishes with time and becomes zero at lease
termination.
The arguments that possessory interests exist in Federal grazing permits
are convincing.

Differences between economic rent and contract rent have

arisen for a number of reasons with the result that economic rent is higher
than the contract rent (Hooper, 1967).

This difference between economic rent

and contract rent leads to a leasehold or possessory interest.

Also, many

ranchers have constructed improvements on publ ic lands, giving rise to a
leasehold interest.

The value of the Federal grazing permit is the value of

the leasehold or possessory interest.

The values of permits have been

variously estimated to fall in the range from $IO.OO/AUM to $50.00/AUM
(Gardner, 1959; Hooper, 1967; Nielsen and Roberts, 1968; Roberts, 1967;
Roberts and Topham, 1965; USDA, 1967).
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The California legislature has seen fit to pass legislation authorizing
taxation of possessory interests on tax exempt lands (Goldman, 1951).
However, practice in assessing possessory interests varies with size of the
county and prevailing custom in the county.

Large counties, defined in terms

of industrial development, may seek out possessory interests, evaluate them,
and proceed to place them on the tax rolls.

Smaller mountain counties may

often overlook possessory interests such as those of the owners of cabins
constructed on federally leased land.

In similar manner, large timber and

grazing interests may escape taxation.
In 1967, the California State Board of Equilization affirmed the
taxability of the possessory interest associated with the grazing of federal
lands (Bean, 1967).

Stockmen questioned whether the agreement for grazing

use is a "license" or a "lease".
only a

Ii )

If the contract vests in the permittee

icense", no "propertyll interest would be held, and hence no tax.

In Kaiser Company? Incorporated vs. Contra Costa County Tax Collector,
J. M. Reid, the test whether an agreement for the use of real estate is a

license or a lease is whether the contract gives "exclusive possession of the
premises against all the world, including the owner", in which case it is a
lease, or whether it merely confers a privilege to occupy under the owner,
in which case it is a license.

Thus, when exclusive use and possession is

granted, it was he 1d that th is does cons t i tute a possessory i nteres t.

A1so,

the court pointed out that Kaiser's interest was an interest for a period
less than perpetuity, hence, an "estate for years l'.
In El Tejon Cattle Company vs.

~ounty

of San Diego, it was held that

El Tejon held a possessory interest even though they only held grazing rights
and the fee owner (Vista Irrigation District) reserved the right to export
water from the land, and other tenants had been granted the hunting and
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other recreational concessions.
The possessory interest in connection with grazing consists of the
control of a situation derived from pub) ic favor, which allows advantage not
enjoyed by others.

This advantage, as in the Kaiser case, is not transferrable.

The court felt that the fact that it was nontransferrable did not remove
Kaiser from the status of lessee, once more making sharp the delineation
between the lease and the license.
The argument has been used that a taxation of a possessory interest
would jeopardize the in-l ieu-tax payments.

This does not seem plausible

because the in-lieu-tax payment is on the land itself and the possessory
interest tax is not on the land but an interest in the property.
A feature of the Kaiser lease was a provision by which the federal
government agreed to assume all taxes levied against Kaiser.

The plea was

made that such a clause put the ultimate tax burden on the United States,
thus giving the state of California the authority to tax the federal government.

This plea was rejected as not being included under Amendment XIV,

Section I, United States Constitution.
In a similar case, United States vs. Allegheny County, the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the right which J\llegheny County
assessor exercised in assessing machinery owned by the United States and
leased to Mesta Company, for one dollar per year, on the basis of possessory
interest.

The court held violation of Amendment XIV.

The

as ~ essor

made a

fundamental error by carrying the machinery on the tax rolls as machinery.
He had assessed not a possessory interest, but the machinery itself.

The

county was found assessing property of the United States and not simply an
interest in that property.
Recently, the California legislature passed legislation prohibiting
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the State Board of Equalization from prescribing rules and regulations with
respect to the assessment of any possessory interest (eCA, Aug. 1968).

Two

County Boards of Supervisors have al s o adopted resolu t ions setting the
assessed value of the possessory interest in Fe deral lands in their counties
at zero (CCA, Sept., 1968).

These actions seemi ngly recogni ze the possessory

inte rest and choose to have it not be subject to t ax.

Howeve r , the

decision to not tax th3 interest does not negate the fact that a pos sessory
interest exists.
'h,\L U/~T i(li'l

OF

P OS S~S S C'RY

INT[ i~ ESTS

The valuati on of f€ ehoJd inte res ts is based on t he ability to extract
capitalization rates
streams of var i ous
interests,

fro~

the marke t by examining sales prices and income

pr 0per t~es

a ~ th otiJh

subject to leases.

In t he case of possessory

ths income stream is known, t he f eehold (representing

SOme!il ing les s t ha n market vaiue of t he la nd a rd being owne d by a government
body)
rate.

alm~s t

never se i ls, so it is impossible to obtain a cu p italization

The refore , it is nearly impo3sible to estimate the value of the fee-

hold i nte rest

an ~

subtracti nG the

t he re by th A val~ e of a pos sessory (leaseho ld ) inte rest by

f ~eho ld va]u8

from t he

valu ~

of

t~e

propert y f ree of leases.

Capitalization at the appropriate interest rate of the difference
between cont ,-act rent cmd ec onom ic re nt n -;> mains
of va luing the

p o~ s es so ry

i nter ~st.

a5

th e only iil8 thod available

Cap ital ization ra t es are cbta i ned from

the ma rket by examining s 21es prices of the

le ~s ~ h olds

(permit prices) and

the income stream (difference betwee n econoiilic rent an d cont ra(:t rent)
assoc i ated with

t ~e

l e3 s 8~o l d s .

The difference between economic rent and

contract rent for federal gra z i ng la nds has been various l y estimated
(Gardner, 1959; Roberts, 1967; Roberts and Topham, 1965).

The difference has
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also been estimated by the Statistical Reporting Service in a 1966 study.
Unfortunately, there is no agreement on the term of the lease; i.e., the
term over which the income should be capital ized and, thus, it is difficult
to estimate the capitalization rate.
FOREST SERVICE AND BlM LEASES
In the case of Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management grazing
leases, the lessor not only pays fee costs for the privilege of grazing
Federal land, but also assumes some non-fee user costs (USDA, 1967).
of these fee and

non~fee

The sum

user costs is equal to contract rent.

Forest Service grazing permits are generally issued for ten year
periods.

BlM leases on Section 15 lands outside grazing districts are also

on a ten year basis.

BlM licenses or permits for (Taylor) grazing

districts (Section 3 lands) are renewed annually.
8ased on the permits, leaseholds (possessory interests) on Forest
Service and Section 15 BLH lands would go to zero value in the year that the
lease or permit expired (the value of the difference between contract rent
and economic rent would be equal to zero).

Section 3 BlM permits, because

they are on an annual basis, should not give rise to leaseholds since there
is no period over which to capitalize the difference between contract and
economic rent.
There does not appear to be any empirical evidence that Forest Service
or Section 15 BLM permits assume zero value in the year of expiration.
Instead, the permit values seem to be rather stable.

Section 3 BLM permits

also seem to have a leasehold value even though there is no long term lease.
The fact that the permits have a value different from what they should have
on strict interpretation of the leases indicates that holders of the permits
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have expectations of lease terms different than those stated in the leases.
The Forest Service and BLM, by design or default, and whether they choose to
recognize it or not, through a policy of continually renewing permits, licenses
and leases, and not raising fees, have created possessory interests and have
caused the expected term of the "permits" to be longer than the lease terms.
It is of interest to ascertain the terms of the leases as expected by
leaseholders and also the expected capitalization rates such that equitable
treatment can be extended to users in the event the leaseholds are terminated.
Roberts (1967), in surveying 635 public and private range situations,
obtained information which can be subjected to analysis in a leasehold framework.

Contract rent on Federal range was determined by an addition of fee

and non-fee user costs (exclusive of interest on permit values).

Economic

rent and observed permit values (Table 1) were taken directly from Roberts'
article.

Contract rent was determined from Roberts' data by subtraction.

Dividing the difference between contract and economic rent (annual
income) by the value of the permit (value of leasehold) gives the capitalization
rate in perpetuity (Table 2, Column 7).

Dividing the permit value by the

annual income gives a factor (Inwood Coefficient) which can be used with a
Ilpresent value of one per period" table to determine capitalization rates
for lease terms less than into perpetuity (Table 2, Column 3).

The

capitalization rate decreases as the expected tenure of the lease diminishes.
INTERPRETATION OF DATA
Condemnation appraisal in real estate practice is based on obtaining
estimates of value in the market.

Compensation is based on market value

or

the highest price estimated in terms of money which a property will bring if
exposed for sale in the open market, allowing a reasonable time to find a
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purchaser who buys with knowledge of all uses to which it is adapted and for
which it is capable of being used (AIREA, 1967).

Various factors are

operative to determine value and the capitalization rate.

All these factors

are reflected in market data estimates of value.
Expected capitalization rates (Table 2) indicate that:

(1) either

holders of permits expect low returns on their investments, or (2) very long
lease

tenure~

Another possibility is that part of the leasehold is

capitalized into base property rather than into the permit (Hooper, 1967).
The amount (if any) of the leasehold capitalized into base property is
impossible to estimate from the data in Roberts· study.
The expected returns also vary with the type of range.

Permits for

spring or fall desert range and for summer desert range are capitalized at
a higher rate (Table 2) or have iower expected longevity than the permits
for other types of range.

This is a reflection of the fact that spring-fall

range types are in areas where urban development is expected and where other
types of land use competitive with livestock grazing is developing.
Capitalization rates for winter desert and summer mountain permits are low
or holders of permits expect that there will not be competing land uses to
end their tenure in the immediate future.

The capitalization rate for the

summer desert permits is no doubt reflective of the fact that there are not
many competing uses and also reflective of the fact that range scientists
are finding that summer use is injurious to desert range and should be
phased out.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION
Any decision involving a change in grazing fees must insure a fair
return to government and equitable treatment to users.
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Fair Returns
The federal government, as an agency of the people, should do those
things for society which they cannot do individually.

Viewing the government

in this light, it is not necessary for revenues to accrue to the federal
Treasury.

Primary and secondary benefits should be measured regardless of

where they accrue (Hooper, 1968).
Bureau of the Budget Circular A-25 requires government agencies to
charge fair market values for federally owned resources.
requires federal agencies to receive economic rent.
nec~ssary

That is, it

Though it is not

that revenues accrue directly to the U.S. Treasury in order to

benefit society, one cannot argue against the effort of the agencies to
charge economic rent except on the basis of the adverse welfare
imp1ications of charging economic rent.
sum~arized

The welfare implications are

in N,elsen and Roberts (1968).

Comre:,sat:~!l

The most important welfare effect of raising fees to economic rent is
the loss of the leasehold (permit value) to livestock operators.

For

approximately ten years, Utah State University researchers (s:Jmmarized in
Hooper, 1967 and Nielsen and Roberts, 1968) have contended that permit
values shou1d be included in the cost of grazing public lands.
operators also contend that permit values should be recognized.

Livestock
.~

new

grazing fee structure for livestock without the inclusion of each of the
above 15 non-fee cost items would be unacceptable to the industry"

(ANCA,

1967, underlining theirs).
A one step increase to full economic rent would eliminate the value of
the permit.

Some holders of permits have bought these permits, others have

paid taxes and many have borrowed money on the permit values with the net
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result that ranchers have considerable capital invested in permits.
the fee to full value would cause great capital loss.

Raising

It has been argued

that if fees are to be raised, this loss of lea s12i'l o1d s hould be compensated
(Hooper, 1967; Nielsen 2nd Roberts, 1968) .

V ; a~!i n 9

a leasehold inte rest, it is easy to justify

com~ ~~ns ation.for

income stream for the li fe or the 18ase.

t he

p~oh: em

in terms of

the loss of an

The pe rmi t va lue is the ca pitalized

value of the income stream (difference between econ()mic arId. contract rent)
for the life of the lease.
liThe key

4 ~; sue

in the grazing fee pol icy controversy ; S vihether the

federal government will recognize the permit

v~lue

as a cost of doing

business for the rancher" (Nielsen and Roberts, 1968).
bodies recognize the permit value.

Various government

Ranchers have been paid the market value

of their permits when reclamation projects have

cause ~

changes in land use.

The Department of Defense has paid for permits ranchers lose when a
military base ha s been established (see Osborne et al vs. United States in
USDA, 1964), and the Internal Revenue Service has allowed the loss of
grazing permits to be written off as capital losses (Nielsen and Roberts, 1968).
The Congress also

recog n~ zed

t he

pos~essory

interest va l ue in 85-868

(September 2, 1958) when it directed liThe Secretary of the Interior shall
compensate

person~

whose grazing permits, licenses or leases covering lands

transferred to the Navajo Tri be pursuant
because of such a transfer."

~o

this section are cancelled

In recognizing the permit value, t he government

agencies have, at 'least tacitly, recognized a possessory interest.

Therefore,

if the government agencies were to eliminate the leaseholds, it can be
argued the ranchers should be compensated for the value of the permits.

The

argument is the same for the increases in fees over a ten year period proposed
by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior.

The net effect is the same ;
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the capital loss still occurs and compensation would be justified.
Of course, there is some precedent for not paying compensation.
Buford vs.

Hout~,

the Supreme Court said the privilege became

II,~ ~~ ~'~

imp1 ied I icense growing out of a custom of nearly a hundred years
Also, in Light vs. United States, the court said:

'~nd 50,

In
an

~~ ~'~

*."

without passing

a statute, or taking any affi"rmative action on the subj ec t, t he Un i ted States
suffered its public do;r.ain to be used for such purposes.

There thus grew up

a sort of implied license that these lands ? thus left open, might be used so

Jong as
to

t:~e

o~~j~;,": ·~~

did i t

d ·~p l

Scvc; r:~;n~nt d id not cance 1 its tac j t con:;.e nt.

..

SB iC:

I t5 fa i 1u re

hcwevet, d id not cenfer ar. y v~ stBd j"i g ii't on the complaint, nor

ive t he Un i te d S tfoi tes of the

1; ~1e

Lat E:r, 'i.-;- .cr.

th ey

~ ~-r ~'.

1 1*

,:',

~~:

PCI.'l8 r

o f \-eca 11 i ng any imp) i ed

CC 0.£ r ess autl"l':>rized the c n'?!atiar of gruzing d i stricts,

hu t t he crct)tion

any ri9ht, tit1e, interest, or

:.-) .~

estat~

a grazing district o r the issuance of

in or to the lands. 11

Whe n t!: e p ~.lb l:c jrlterest demar-·ds t!-~ flt the gO'l.err.r;;s nt ta kA over IJrea)

owne i .

e ut i-f iarg8ss is re' !()Ked in the publ ie in t E.re st, the ho1der

ordi narily

rece~ves

nc

co~pensa t ion.

develope d ;II/:th 1 i"i:t~e regurd fo r p n) ..: ed~!re (a po s~es ~o ql inte r-est is real
property).

The g ~ant, denia1, .. evo~ (J tior, and administration of government

largess shou!d be subject to scrupniou5 cb5ei-van~e of fair prccedures.
Government should gain no pO\l1'~ ;' ~ as .:1sai :lst const i t uti onal limitations, by
reason of its role as a dispenser of wealth (Reich,

19~~).

Although there is precedent for not compensating permit holders for

the loss of their possessory interests, the real question becomes an
ethical one:

What is equitable to the users?

Expected Tenure
A characteristic of a leasehold interest is that the value goes to
zero at the termination of the lease.

Livestock operators have expressed a

desire that leaseholds (permits) be capitalized at 6%.

If this be the case,

then the capitalization period would be 12 years for spring-fall and foothill range, and up to 100 years for other range types (Table 3).

Capitalizati o~

rates of a magnitude less than 6% are more consistent with market estimates.
In fact, 1arge ranches seldom return more than 3-5%, small ranches return
less than 3% and many times have negative rates.

If purchasers and operators

of livestock ranches operate with "overall capitalization rate" (AIREA, 1967)
expectations of less than 5%, it is not unreasonable that they would also
expect a similar rate on grazing leases, permits and licenses.

Assuming a

2% capitalization rate and that the data are truly reflective of present
market conditions, the expected tenures are from 8 to 27 years.

That is, the

holders of the permits expect them to be terminated and the leasehold to go
to zero value in from 8 to 27 years, depending on the type of range.
Equitable Treatment
The impl ication for equitable treatment is that there need not be any
compensation if the permits, licenses or leases are allowed to run until the
expected termination date.

If the permits, licenses or leases are terminated

before the expected expiration date, the permit holder should be compensated
for his interest for the remaining part of the expected life.
Through careful identification and ana1ysis of comparables by experienced
fee appraisers, economists and government personnel, expected tenures and
capitalization rates can be determined.

With this information, the leasehold

15

can be terminated at the expiration of the estimated expected tenure.

THE PRESENT PROPOSAL
The proposal put forth in the joint announcement by Secretary Freeman
and Secretary Udall does not solve the problem of compensation. it only
masks the problem.
Permit holders have tenure expectations possibly as low as eight years. but
probably longer (Table 3).

The permit value is the present value of the

difference between contract rent and economic rent for the expected tenure
of the permit (Figure 1).

The announcement by the Secretaries sets a ten

year amortization period.

Even without the proposed increases, the

recognition of only a ten year tenure causes an immediate capital loss on all
permits with expected tenures of more than ten years.

The effect is to

reduce the value of the leasehold by shortening the life of the lease
(Figure 1).

This value loss should be compensated.

Assuming a ten year permit tenure (either the true expected tenure or
that caused by a reduction of a longer expected tenure), the permit holder,
under the proposal, is being told his leasehold will have zero value at
lease termination.

In addition, however, the rancher is being told that he

must pay increased fees over a ten year period.
At the beginning of the ten year period, the rancher has the expectation
of receiving an income stream (difference between contract and economic rent)
for the terms of the lease (ten years) which is equal to the full market
value of the permit.

At the end of the first of the ten years, the leasehold

is the value of the income stream for nine years.

The rancher has lost

approximately one-tenth of the original income stream.

Rut in the meantime,

the rancher has been asked to pay approximately one-tenth more fees for the
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remainder of the lease.

At the end of the second year, the expected income

stream is for eight years and the fee is still higher.

The net effect is

that the expected income stream is reduced by about one-half (Figure 2).

The

expected permit value is reduced by the amount of the reduction in the
income stream.

This loss in permit value should be compensated.

Thus, the

proposal by the Secretaries does not handle adequately the problem of
compensation because it does not recognize the concept of a possessory interest.
Furthermore, the formula for setting fees does not make adequate
provision for changes in non-fee user costs.

If non-fee user costs should

fall, this would again give rise to a possessory interest and a "permit
value".

If non-fee user costs should rise, this would establ ish a "negative"

leasehold to the disadvantage of the users.

Also, the government, through

this proposal, has implied that the expected lease life (tenure) is ten
years.

The data (Roberts, 1967) indicate. , lithe market" has somewhat

different expectations (Table 3).
CONClUS IONS

It is difficult to argue with the attempt by the government agencies
to obtain fair value (economic rent) for the use of the publ ic grazing
resource except in terms of the welfare implications.

However, the magnitude

of the welfare implications of fee increases is large and should be examined.
It Is easy to argue with the ethics of the proposed method of achieving
fa i r va I ue.
The evidence that possessory interests do exist in connection with
Federal grazing permits is convincing.

Even though the Forest Service and

BlM choose not to recognize leaseholds, a possessory interest or real
property, largess does exist.

When the concept of possessory interest is
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recognized, it becomes readily apparent that the present proposal is (1)
in conflict with accepted theory and practice in treating real property
and (2) in conflict with legal precedent.

The proposal to increase fees

over a ten year period only masks the problem of compensation, but does not
adequately handle it.

The proposal appears to be ill-directed and il1-

advised.
Through recognition of a possessory interest and by letting the
expected leasehold tenure expire, the Federal agencies may receive full
value for the grazing resource while treating the users equitably.
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Table 1.

Contract rents, economic rents and permit values on Forest Service
and BlM grazing lands in dollars (adapted from Roberts, 1967).

Difference
Co 1UrTlI1 1
Contract
rent

Economic
rent

&

Column 2

Permi t
values

BlM Cattle
1•

\-Ji nter desert

2.53

2.

Spring-fa1l desert

2.28

11

3.37

0.84

12.08

3.40

I . 12

8.52

3. Summer foothill

2.25

4.

Summer desert

2.61+

5.

Year-long desert

3.25

23.32

3.S0

11 .75

13.51
4.03

1.39

10.61

BlM Sheep

6.
FS Cattle

7. Summer mountain

3.05

4.79

1 .74

20. 13

5.00

6.25

1 .25

26.15

FS Sheep

8.

Su~mer

mountain

----------------~
·

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _c _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

II Obtained by subtracting (3.25 - .72). Original data Tab1e 1, Columns 3
and 8, Roberts, 1967.
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Table 2.

Capitalization rates ( in percent) for leaseholds for different
expect ed lease terms of Forest Service and 8LM grazing permits.

---Difference
Type of
Per;nit from from
Table 1
Tabl e 1

J'

Facto;-'
(p •\.J • o-f

one/~eriodl

Permi t
va 1ue
{do l1a r"s)

Capital ization Rates1.1
10 'tr.

20

:ir.

30

~r.

Peq~etui

0.84

x

]4.331

=

12.08

I .0

3.0+

5.0+

2

1 • 12

x

7.687

=

8.52

5.0+

11 .0+

12.0+

13. 1

4

1 .39

x

7.633

=

10.61

5.0-

11 .0-:

12.0+

13. 1

7

1.74

x

11.580

=

20. 15

1.0

5.0+

7.0+

8. E

8

1 .?5

x

20. ~;:~~ 0

=

26. 15

1 .0

1 .0

2.0

4.6

Thus, 12.08 ~

11

The factor is obtained by dividing Column 4 by Column 2.
0.84 = 14.381.

11

Obtained from P.W. of one/period table using PW factor for appropriate
number of years (sometimes called the Internal Rata of Return).

6.9
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Table 3.

Expected lea se terms in years at different ccpitalization rates
for Fo r3st Service an d BlM grazing permits •
.

_-_

... .- .... . . . _

.- --..

.- -

~-

Type of Permit
from Table 1

Fc.;ctor from
,.,
T-:-lb 1e .!

C ~p i t;~ ~

i zat ;,on

Ra :::~ 5

2%

'i.'o

" '/

p%

8o/r
...2

1L~ ~ 381

17

22

34

100+

2

7.607

8

9

10

12

4

7.633

8

9

11

12

7

11.580

13

16

20

34

8

20.92

27

L:-6

100+

100+
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-- ._--- _

. .. -

._- -- ----- -- -- - - ..

.

~

- --

,

. ..

-

!

I

Income Stream
1--------

\
I

1

J

fee costs

._--_ __..... ._-------_.
. ...

!

contract rent

non-fee costs

economic rent

i
1

I

. _j
-V ""

life of lease
Value of leasehold
Figure 1.

= present

value of income stream for the I ife of the lease.

Representation of leasehold valuation before the proposed
increases in grazing fees.

-=r-;

r- ;

Income stream

I~
"

~

r-J'-~
,-

-

- ..

I

I

- - -!

Increased fees
--

-

-

-

-""'!-'

-

.

!

I

j

\ . econom i c rent

1

I

I

1968 fee costs
i

;'--'- ._ - - - - _._._----

f

i
j

---

non-fee costs
.- . . , , - - - - - - )

1 i fe of lease
Value of leasehold
Figure 2.

= present

value of income stream for the life of the lease.

Representation of leasehold valuation with the proposed increases
in grazing fees over a ten year period.
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